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Non-Technical Summary
After the financial crisis, regulatory authorities increased their scrutiny in banking regulation in order to reach again financial stability. One of the focus areas of their new efforts is the leveraged lending market with a specific focus on leveraged buyouts (LBOs). As acknowledged by different U.S. regulators, they see LBOs as potentially harmful to the financial system.
In addition to banks which are in the center of systemic risk, other institutions can also contribute to it. In the literature, authors already showed the impact of hedge funds and insurance firms on systemic risk. I want to bridge a gap in the literature by analyzing whether LBO loan exposures impact the systemic risk of the banks investing in these loans. Given the high riskiness of the LBO business model and the huge amount of bank-provided debt to finance these deals, it is stunning that the link between LBOs and bank systemic risk has not been emphasized so far.
My paper leads to four major results. First, LBO loan exposures have a significant influence on bank systemic risk with banks having higher levels of systemic risk when financing more LBOs. Second, LBO loans are the only loan purpose that impact systemic risk adversely. Third, several drivers of this impact on systemic risk exist: It increases in the size of the LBO banking network a financial institution is connected to and in the bank size. However, the impact of LBO loan exposure on systemic risk decreases if the bank had a lending relationship with the PE sponsor in the past, more experience in the LBO financing market or a higher credit rating. Finally, the influence of LBO loan exposure on systemic risk cannot only be measured on a cross-sectional level but also on a national level when using a country-wide measure of systemic risk.
My results could provide guidance for regulatory authorities to identify exactly the type of banks that are putting the financial stability with their LBO debt underwriting at risk. These banks are typically well connected, large, less experienced in the LBO market and have lower credit ratings. Additionally, it provides evidence for the recent changes in regulation, increasing the attention on LBO and leveraged lending business.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, regulatory authorities increased their scrutiny in banking regulation (see Moshirian (2011) for a detailed discussion) in order to reach and sustain financial stability. One of the focus areas of the two national bank regulators in the U.S., the Federal Reserve and the OCC (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), is the leveraged lending market with a specific focus on leveraged buyouts (LBO) and their impact on systemic risk. In order to increase the soundness of the financial system, they published a leveraged lending guideline in March 2013 to reduce the LBO impact on systemic risk as highlighted by the following quote:
"In the letters, the Federal Reserve and the OCC demanded banks [to] comply with [the leveraged lending] guidance published in March 2013 saying they should avoid financing takeover deals that involve putting debt on a company of more than six times its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation, or Ebitda […] . For banks, the pressure comes as Washington seeks to crack down on behaviour seen as potentially harmful to the broader financial system. […] "The impact on private equity, a significant driver of what we see as risky practices, is an intended consequence of our actions," Martin Pfinsgraff, the OCC's senior deputy comptroller for large-bank supervision, said in an interview. " 2 Although banks are in the focus when thinking about systemic risk (see e.g., Billio et al. (2012) ), the quote shows that there are also other institutions that contribute to it. 3 However, given the attention from regulatory authorities to LBOs and their links to banks, it is stunning that, to my knowledge, the impact of LBO transactions on bank systemic risk has not been investigated at all. As private equity firms are investing in high-risk deals with huge amounts of debt (see Axelson et al. (2013) for a discussion of LBO deal structure and pricing), the risks of financing these deals are higher for banks than the risks from other loan purposes such as normal acquisitions or working capital financing. Together with the fact that LBO financing are typically syndicated to a group of banks that are connected to each other through other loans, the riskiness of LBO deals should have an impact of the systemic risk of the banks. 
Literature Overview
Three strands of literature are related to the research question of this paper: the general literature about systemic risk, riskiness of private equity deals and relationships between private equity firms and banks.
As there exist many ideas and definitions of systemic risk, I follow the work of Allen and Carletti (2013) which categorize drivers of systemic risk into four distinct types: i) banking crises due to panics, ii) banking crises due to asset price falls (and common exposures), iii) contagion and iv) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system. The source of systemic risk described in this paper can be attributed to the contagion factor described by Allen and Carletti (2013 measure. It calculates the propensity to be undercapitalized when the entire financial system is undercapitalized. The authors show that this methodology combines two aspects of systemic risk, the bank's leverage ratio and its expected loss in the tails. Some authors use macroeconomic measures to complement their results derived from cross-sectional variables, a well-known macroeconomic measure is CATFIN which has been presented by Allen et al. (2012) . CATFIN is essentially a VaR measure that aggregates three parametric and non-parametric VaR approaches to estimate the systemic risk of the financial sector. It has been developed to improve the forecasts of macroeconomic developments triggered by the risks in the financial sector. When it comes to factors influencing systemic risk, different channels of influence have been analyzed. Loan syndication for example has been shown to play an ambiguous role in explaining systemic risk differences. As Wagner (2010) points out loan syndication might be beneficial for the financial system as it helps banks to diversify their portfolios. Beck and De Jonghe (2013) present a similar idea as they show that industrial sector specialization (which means less diversification of risks) leads to higher stock return volatility and higher levels of systemic risk. This would mean that higher diversification of risks would lead to lower stock return volatility and lower levels of systemic risk. However, there might also be a costs associated with diversification and syndication as it increases systemic risks via exposing banks to the same risks. Cai et al. (2014) develop this idea by showing that portfolio similarity based on similar industry exposures leads to higher systemic risks. In another paper, Anginer et al. (2014) analyze the ambiguous role of competition among banks and show that lower competition among banks leads to higher systemic risk as banks have lower incentives to take on diversified risks compared to the high competition case. López-Espinosa et al. (2012) focus on funding and show that banks with higher short-term funding ratios have higher levels of systemic risk which might be explained by a more pronounced interconnectedness of these banks. A similar result has already been analyzed by Rochet and Tirole (1996) which presents evidence that interconnectedness through the interbank market increases financial contagion which leads to "too-big-to-fail"-banks. But there are not only banks contributing to the financial fragility. Billio et al. (2012) show by using principal components analysis and Granger-causality networks that linkages within and across banks, brokers/dealers, insurances and hedge funds increased which could be a source of systemic risk.
However, analyzing the directions of the linkages, the authors conclude that banks are still more central to the systemic risk than the other types of institutions. Similarly, Adams et al. (2014) quantify risk spillovers among types of financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds and insurance companies) by using quantile regressions. They show that shocks have large spillover effects in volatile times and that commercial banks and hedge funds are the main transmitters of shocks to other financial institutions. Focusing on another type of systemic risk drivers, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) show that banks with a higher proportion of noninterest income (such as investment banking fees) have higher systemic risks than traditional deposit-and-lending institutions. De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) analyze the emergence of consolidation among large banks and conclude that more pronounced consolidation leads to higher interdependencies and therefore to higher systemic risk.
The evidence on riskiness of private equity deals in general is rather mixed. Tykvová and Borell (2012) show that financial distress increases after the buyout of a company, but that these firms do not suffer from higher bankruptcy rates than comparable peers which they attribute to the superior distress management skills of private equity firms. Hotchkiss et al. (2014) draw a somewhat different picture by analyzing the drivers of private equity-backed company's distress.
They come to the conclusion that PE-backed firms suffer from higher bankruptcy rates and that these higher risks can be fully explained by the higher leverage ratios. reducing information asymmetries which should be very pronounced for LBOs. They conclude that LBOs benefit from lower spreads and looser covenants once they get financed relationship banks. Additionally, LBOs receive even better loan terms, the higher their cross-selling potential.
A similar paper has been presented by Bharath et al. (2011) which put the results shown by Ivashina and Kovner (2011) to the more general level: All borrowers benefit from better loan terms once they tap banks with which they have lending relationships. These relationships are more important for intransparent borrowers as in the case of LBO borrowers. Finally, Demiroglu
and James (2010) present evidence that reputable PE firms benefit from better loan terms that less-reputable companies. They attribute this finding to two effects: First, reputable firms seem to be better in timing credit markets as they are more active in times of lows spreads and looser lending standards. But more importantly, reputable PE firms reduce agency costs in lending and therefore earn more favorable loan terms such as lower spreads and longer maturities.
Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
As discussed in the introduction, I want to analyze the impact of leveraged buyout financing on systemic risk for a cross-section of financial institutions by using syndicated loan data. I focus on this credit type as it is the most important source of financing for LBOs (see e.g., Axelson et al. (2013) ) and is widely used in academia. lenders often invest in U.S. leveraged buyouts. As described in Cai et al. (2014) , SRISK is calculated with the following formula:
Data Set
with k as prudential capital ratio which is assumed to be 8% for all regions and 5.5% for European banks to account for differences in accounting standards, D as book value of debt, LRMES as the long-run marginal expected shortfall which is defined as the co-movement of a bank's equity when the overall banking system equity decreases by 40% over 6 months and MV as the bank's market value. SRISK% is then just SRISK divided by the sum of SRISK of all banks in the same quarter to receive a proxy for a bank's systemic risk relative to all other financial institutions.
As America and 2 in Africa. All variables are described in Table 1 .
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 
Empirical Results
In order to analyze the impact of the LBO exposure on a bank's systemic risk, I estimate models with the natural logarithm of SRISK and SRISK% as dependent variables and the LBO exposure
as key independent variable. Additional controls are the interconnectedness to other LBO financing banks, the natural logarithm of the number of LBO events, a dummy indicating when the U.S. is in a recession, the natural logarithm of the bank's total assets, its syndicated loan market share and the high yield spread. All independent variables are lagged by one quarter.
Finally, I control for firm fixed effects and cluster the standard errors on a quarterly level to correct for correlations across banks in the same quarter due to common shocks such as e.g. the Lehman collapse. The results can be found in Table 3 observations. As can be seen in Table 10 , even on a nation-wide aggregated level, the LBO exposure has a significant positive influence on the systemic risk in the financial industry irrespective of controlling for the other types of loan exposures. I can therefore show that the influence of LBO exposure on systemic risk does not seem to be a zero-sum game when analyzing the entire economy which provides a further rationale for the ongoing tighter regulation of the LBO financing industry.
Conclusion
In As regulatory requirements for LBO lending changed just recently, it will be an interesting area for future research to assess whether this policy change will break down the influence of LBO loan exposure on systemic risk. Table 6 IV Approach -Robustness Test This table presents the coefficient estimates of an IV approach. Definitions of all variables can be found in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered by quarter to correct for correlations across banks in the same quarter due to common shocks. ***, **, and * correspond to the statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Table 7 Drivers of Impact of LBO Exposure on Systemic Risk This table presents the coefficient estimates of OLS regressions. Definitions of all variables can be found in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered by quarter to correct for correlations across banks in the same quarter due to common shocks. ***, **, and * correspond to the statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Controls
Count relationships to other banks 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 ( Adjusted R-squared 0.87 0.87 Table 8 Other Fixed Effects -Robustness Test This table presents the coefficient estimates of OLS regressions. Definitions of all variables can be found in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered by quarter to correct for correlations across banks in the same quarter due to common shocks. ***, **, and * correspond to the statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. LBO exposure 0.31*** (0.11) 0.18 (0.11) 0.24** (0.12) 0.27** (0.12) 0.21* (0.11) 0.24** (0.12)
Ln [SRISK]

Controls
Count relationships to other banks 0.00 (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00 ( Table 9 Autocorrelation -Robustness Test This table presents the coefficient estimates of OLS regressions. Definitions of all variables can be found in Table  1 . Standard errors are clustered by quarter to correct for correlations across banks in the same quarter due to common shocks. ***, **, and * correspond to the statistical significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
